SECRET//COMINT

● (24 Jan 68)

QUESTION: If you are considered Mr. SIGINT, General Carter, why did the Navy have charge of the mission?

ANSWER: There are various resources which are made available to military departments for purposes of direct support to field commanders. NSA has delegated operational control over selected SIGINT resources to military departments for this purpose. In this manner the military departments satisfy their own unique SIGINT requirements and NSA gains through receipt of the intelligence collected by the platform in this mode of operation.

QUESTION: Who determines the closest point of approach/proximity to the shore line?

ANSWER: The Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Reconnaissance Center determines and approves the closest point of approach for all military reconnaissance operations; and this determination is also approved by the 303 Committee.

QUESTION: Information of a sensitive nature was released to the public in explaining the Pueblo incident. Where did this information come from?

ANSWER:	The	position	information	of :	the	Pueblo	and	the	North	Korean	ships

QUESTION: Why doesn't the United States have more trawlers of this type in order to compete with the Soviet Union?

ANSWER:	At presen	nt there	are three	<u>intelligence</u>	collection	ships of the
trawler ty	pe in the	United	States.			

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

(a) (3)-18 USC 798

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



OUESTION: What was the mission of the Pueblo?

ANSWER: The Pueblo's primary mission was direct support for Navy. NSA was not directly involved in either the planning or the execution of the mission.

QUESTION: What, if anything, did NSA have to do with the operation?

ANSWER: NSA was advised on the 13th of December that the operation would be conducted in support of Navy requirements. NSA, taking advantage of the opportunity to levy tasking on a not-to-interfere basis, levied tasking to the Navy. Since the Pueblo was in Mode 1 operation, it was not available for primary NSA tasking. NSA did not have anything to do with the tracking of the Pueblo, the time frame, etc.

QUESTION: Why was the Pueblo so close?

ANSWER: In order to intercept HF and VHF signals effectively the closer the intercept platform is to the source of intercept the greater the quality of intercept. Since VHF is line of sight and the North Koreans are known to use low-power communications, it was probably considered necessary by the Navy to position the platform as close as possible for optimum collection capability.

QUESTION: How many of these ships are there?

ANSWER: There are seven to the least research ships and three AGERs. The total research are the OXFORD, GEORGETOWN, JAMESTOWN, BELMONT, LIBERTY, VALDEZ and the MULLER. The three AGERs are the BANNER and the PUEBLO in the Pacific and the PALM BEACH (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (c) (3)-18 U

QUESTION: In view of the recent provocative acts by the North Koreans what action did NSA take, if any, to advise the Navy of the danger involved?

ANSWER: As soon as NSA became aware of the mission, consideration was given to the possibility of advising the JCS of past experience regarding harassment, etc., by the Koreans. On the 29th of December NSA did advise the JCS of the past history regarding reconnaissance efforts against the North Koreans. This information was based on SIGINT.

QUESTION: Was this the first operation of this kind against the North Koreans?

ANSWER: Yes, to my knowledge this was the first mission directed against North Korea.

QUESTION: What experience have we gained from harassment tactics on the part of the Soviets, Koreans and Chinese.

ANSWER: The BANNER, the first AGER to deploy, is subjected to harassment usually on every deployment by either elements of the Navy or fishing vessels whether by the Soviets, Chinese or whatever.

QUESTION: Who approved this mission?

ANSWER: The JCS approved the mission of the Pueblo on 3 January.

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QUESTION: What sensitive equipment was on board the Pueblo?

ANSWER: The Pueblo contained numerous receivers and recorders and ancillary equipment designed to monitor high frequency, very high frequency

It also had a direction finding capability, an electronics intelligence analysis capability and a position devoted to monitoring of Soviet telemetry. The communications equipment in support of the monitoring effort included the latest and most sophisticated communications systems available to the U.S. Government.

QUESTION: How much of the equipment and material was destroyed to our knowledge?

ANSWER: We do not know for sure. We do know that destruction was accomplished; however, we do not know the extent of the destruction. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that we took immediate action to prevent further compromise by changing and superceding keying material known to have been aboard the Pueblo.

QUESTION: How many crew members had access to this highly classified material.

ANSWER: Of the 83 crew members aboard the ship 31 possessed special intelligence clearances. Included are the 29 Naval Security Group personnel who had intensive exposure to signals intelligence.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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QUESTION: Do we know how the four crew members were injured?

ANSWER: No. Injury could have been as a result of the destruction of equipment or North Korean action.

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SECRET//COMINT

QUESTION: Do we know how the four crew members were injured?


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
SECTION

## **QUESTIONS**

- 1. How and why was operational control delegated?
- 2. What were the COMSEC and SIGINT responsibilities of the several authorities at the time of the incident or at the time OPCON was delegated, e.g., DIRNSA, DIRNAVSECGRU, CNO, CINCPAC, JCS, CINCPA CFLT, etc.
- 3. Who determined what crypto equipment and materials were placed aboard? What SIGINT equipment and materials? Were these determinations properly made?
- 4. What new procedures went into effect following the Liberty incident? Did they affect the Pueblo?
- 5. When OPCON is delegated, what are the residual responsibilities of DIRNSA?
- 6. What material aboard the Pueblo was not required for its mission?
- 7. Who has responsibility for disqualifying personnel for the kind of assignment on account of their knowledgeability level?
- 8. Who determines, and who should determine, the requirement of for this kind of a special mobile operation?

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- 9. What general instructions have been issued to Commanding Officers of SIGINT trawlers to follow in the event of hostile action? Does DIRNSA have any responsibilities in this area?
- 10. What specific instructions, if any, were given to the Commanding Officer of the USS PUEBLO on the mission of his ship?
- 11. Was any higher degree of destruct capability afforded the SIGINT equipment aboard trawlers?
- 12. What were the factors that guided the decision to limit the asmament aboard the USS PUEBLO to 50 cal. MGs? Did the SIGNT package and manning have a role in the decision?
- 13. Did the C.O. of the USS PUEBLO have detailed instructions pertaining to the order of priority in which secure equipment and codeword material was to be destroyed?
- 14. Were not the rules for the USS BANNER to remain at least thirty nautical miles from the CHICOM coast? Were there different rules placed in effect for North Korea? If so, when? Why?

Manager Committee Control

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